Plato's Essentialism : Reinterpreting the Theory of Forms

1. Verfasser: Politis, Vasilis.
Ort/Verlag/Jahr: Cambridge : University of Cambridge ESOL Examinations, 2021.
Umfang/Format: 1 online resource (264 pages).
Parallelausgabe: Politis, Vasilis, Plato's Essentialism (Print version:) | ISSN: 9781108833660
Inhalte/Bestandteile: 1 Datensätze
Online Zugang: Available online for registrated users of FID
Inhaltsangabe:
  • Cover
  • Half-title
  • Title page
  • Copyright information
  • Dedication
  • Contents
  • Acknowledgements
  • Introduction
  • Addendum
  • Chapter 1 Why cannot the ti esti question be answered by example and exemplar?: Hippias Major
  • Chapter 2 Why cannot essences, or Forms, be perceived by the senses?: Hippias Major. Phaedo. Republic
  • 2.1 Problems with the standard answer, and in defence of a very different answer
  • 2.2 The origin of this answer in the Hippias Major
  • 2.3 This is what is behind the claim in the Phaedo that essences and Forms cannot be perceived by the senses
  • 2.4 From beautiful to equal and one
  • 2.5 From beautiful, equal and one to human and bed
  • 2.6 What about numbers? Does Plato's argument extend to them?
  • 2.7 That Forms cannot be perceived by the senses does not imply that they can be known only a priori
  • Chapter 3 Why are essences, or Forms, unitary, uniform and non-composite? Why are they changeless? Eternal? Are they logically independent of each other?: Phaedo and Republic
  • 3.1 The unity, uniformity and non-compositeness of Forms
  • 3.1.1 A false start
  • 3.1.2 Unitary accounts and unitary things
  • 3.2 Plato's reasoning for the claim that Forms are unitary, uniform and non-composite
  • 3.3 Are Forms logically independent of each other?
  • 3.4 The changelessness and the eternality of Forms
  • 3.5 A false start, on the changelessness of Forms
  • 3.6 Plato's reasoning for the claim that Forms are changeless
  • 3.7 Whether the eternality of Forms can be defended in a similar way
  • Chapter 4 The relation between knowledge and enquiry in the Phaedo
  • 4.1 Two seemingly conflicting epistemological claims in the Phaedo
  • 4.2 Why sense-perception is necessary to think of a Form
  • 4.3 How to reconcile the two epistemological claims in the Phaedo.
  • 4.4 The question (How can Plato's two claims be reconciled?) answered
  • 4.5 The priority of enquiry over knowledge in the Phaedo
  • Chapter 5 Why are essences, or Forms, distinct from sense-perceptible things?: Phaedo 74 and Republic V. 478-479
  • 5.1 Phaedo 74a9-c10
  • 5.2 Republic V. 478e7-479d5
  • Chapter 6 Why are essences, or Forms, the basis of all causation and explanation?: Phaedo 95-105
  • 6.1 What is new?
  • 6.2 Plato's aporia about explanation (Phaedo 95e8-99d3)
  • 6.3 Plato's resolution of the aporia about explanation: explanantia are, primarily, essences (Phaedo 99d4-102b3)
  • 6.4 The sufficiency claim
  • 6.5 The necessity claim
  • 6.6 The simple and the complex schema of explanation (Phaedo 102b3-105c7)
  • 6.7 Addendum: The interlude about good-based (teleological) explanations (Phaedo 97b8-99d3)
  • Chapter 7 What is the role of essences, or Forms, in judgements about sense-perceptible and physical things?: Republic VII. 523-525
  • 7.1 To whom is the argument in Republic VII. 523a-525a addressed?
  • 7.2 The general structure, and aim, of Plato's argument in Republic 523a-525a
  • 7.2.1 Is the passage basically about the conversion-inducing power of arithmetic?
  • 7.2.2 A summary view of Plato's argument and its structure
  • 7.2.3 The crux (both substantial and interpretative) of Plato's argument
  • 7.2.4 What judgements, as reported by sense-perception, need to be investigated further by thought, before they can be allowed to stand?
  • 7.3 An analysis of Plato's argument, and his verbal means of indicating it, in greater detail
  • 7.3.1 The 'finger' passage and its place in the overall argument (523a1-524b2)
  • 7.3.2 The locus of a problem with sense-perception, and the general character of this problem
  • 7.3.3 In response to an objection
  • 7.3.4 Why unity and number are brought into the argument (524b1-c14).
  • 7.3.5 The meaning of the phrase tí oun pot' esti to mega au kai to smikron: a question of how to individuate the object of perception (524c10-11)
  • 7.3.6 The distinction between sense-perceptible things and intelligible things (524c13-14)
  • 7.3.7 Socrates' last question: How can we specify a concept of unity? (524d1-525a3)
  • 7.3.8 Glaucon's answer (524d1-525a14)
  • 7.3.9 Unity (to hen) once again
  • Chapter 8 Why does thinking of things require essences, or Forms?: Parmenides
  • 8.1 The relation between thinking and being, and its relevance for the dispute about Forms, in the first part of the dialogue
  • 8.2 Forms here, in the first part of the dialogue, are basically essences
  • 8.3 The transition to the second part of the dialogue
  • 8.4 Being, thinking, and the Form of oneness in the second part of the dialogue
  • 8.5 Conclusion
  • Chapter 9 Why are essences, or Forms, separate from physical things?: Also Timaeus and Philebus
  • 9.1 Immortality and separation in the Phaedo
  • 9.2 Unitary (etc.) versus human (etc.) in Parmenides 130
  • 9.3 Is the Parmenides (130) passage consonant with, and confirmed by, dialogues that went before?
  • 9.4 How is the Parmenides (130) passage taken further, and worked out, in dialogues that come after?
  • 9.5 Aristotle's testimony
  • Chapter 10 What yokes together mind and world?: Phaedo 99-100 and Republic VI. 505-509
  • 10.1 Addendum
  • Conclusion: Forms simply are essences, not things that have essences
  • Bibliography
  • General Index
  • Index Locorum.

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